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Abstract
Over the last few years many consumer-related
virtual auction sites have sprung up on the web.  One of
the most successful of these is eBay.  Single item auctions
on this site share characteristics with both English and a
hybrid combination of first-price and second-price sealed
bid auctions.  This paper describes research in progress to
determine the effects of the specific structure of eBay
auctions on bidding strategies while drawing on
traditional auction theory which was devised by
examining "live" auctions not mediated by computers.
The results of the study should have implications for
bidders, sellers, and managers of auction web sites.
The Rise of Virtual Auctions
A number of consumer-related virtual auction
sites have sprung up on the web over the last few years
selling everything from collectibles to automobiles and
fine art.  A guide to art, antique, and collectible web sites
declared eBay the winning site due to the vast number of
auctions and registered users (Ebeling et al., 1999).  eBay,
which was launched in 1995, currently has over 4 million
ongoing auctions, more than 7 million registered users,
and over 1.5 billion page views per month.  The number
of auctions handled by virtual auction sites may soon
surpass those conducted by traditional "live" auction
houses in many categories of goods.  One art expert
predicts that 90% of art auctions will move to the Internet
(Klebnikov, 1999).  As this new mechanism for
facilitating auctions becomes more ubiquitous applying
traditional auction theory to an examination of the effects
of the different auction structures may provide valuable
lessons for sellers, bidders, and maintainers of virtual
auction sites.  We propose to examine the structure of
single-item auctions on a particular virtual auction site,
eBay, and determine whether predictions based on
traditional auction theory devised from "live" auctions not
mediated by a computerized system hold true.
Traditional Auction Theory
Much of the auction theory literature is devoted
to measuring the revenue outcomes from the various types
of auctions.  This paper specifically looks at auction
theory related to English and first-price and second-price
sealed bid auctions.  English auctions in a "live" setting
are the most common auction type.  They entail an open
outcry bidding process that involves increasing the price
until the highest bidder is identified.  This bidder then
pays the bid price for the given item.  The first-price and
second-price sealed bid auctions involve accepting sealed
bids and declaring the highest bidder the winner.  In the
case of the second-price sealed bid the highest bidder is
required to pay the amount of the second highest bid for
the given item.
One of the first theoretical premises in auction
theory (Vickrey, 1961) resulted in a series of Nash
equilibrium models which indicate English auctions, first-
price sealed bid auctions, and second-price sealed bid
auctions should result in the same revenue to the seller for
independent private value auctions.  Milgrom and Weber
(1982) developed a theoretical general model which
demonstrated, among other things, that for affiliated
private value auctions when bidders know the value the
item holds for them that bids in English and second-price
sealed bid auctions should be equal to each other and
higher than bids in first-price sealed bid auctions.  In
addition, when the value of the item is unknown to the
bidder English bids result in the highest values, second-
price sealed bids in the second-highest values, and first-
price sealed bids result in the lowest values.  Values are
independent when the bidder has no information
regarding the value of the item to other potential bidders.
Values are affiliated if it is the case that when bidders
receive information indicating their values for an item are
likely to be high (or low) this indicates that other bidders'
values are also likely to be high (or low).
Later, results of a series of lab experiments
indicate that second-price sealed bids result in higher
revenues than English bids for affiliated private value
auctions (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, 1987) suggesting
that bidders behave irrationally.  In a recent field
experiment, Lucking-Reiley (1999) determined that
English auctions resulted in the same revenues as second-
price sealed bid auctions for private value auctions.  At
this time there have been no field studies in the auction
literature that perform these equivalence tests on single-
item auctions where it is possible for bidders to submit
bids with the characteristics of both English auctions and
sealed bid auctions.  This paper addresses this issue by
testing using the stricter hybrid sealed bid auctions
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contained in the eBay market structure and English
auctions in an affiliated private value context.
Characteristics of the Virtual Auction Site
eBay
Although there are a variety of virtual auction
sites using many different formats to support their
auctions, for the current research we have chosen to
concentrate on a particular site, eBay.  As noted earlier,
eBay is the most popular consumer-related virtual auction
site; an examination should yield sufficient data to draw
well-supported conclusions that will be applicable to
other auction sites with a similar market structure.
The most common type of auction in the
collectibles section of eBay involves sellers listing a
single item for sale specifying a minimum bid for that
item.  If the item receives at least one bid, the seller and
the highest bidder are obligated to conclude the
transaction. A variant on this auction type allows sellers
to set a reserve price that is higher than the minimum bid
and known only to them.  The fact that the item has a
reserve price and whether or not that reserve price has
been met is noted in the auction description.  If the item
receives at least one bid at or higher than the reserve, the
seller and highest bidder are obligated to conclude the
transaction.
Sellers on eBay may choose to run either type of
auction for three, five, seven, or ten days.  Auctions close
exactly at the time of day as originally posted.  For
example, if a seller begins a three day auction at 10:37:14
a.m. on August 10, the auction closes at 10:37:14 a.m. on
August 13.  eBay has a feature which allows a bidder to
enter the maximum amount he or she is willing to pay for
an item.  The system automatically executes bids based on
the current highest bid plus the minimum bid increment.
eBay uses the term "proxy" bidding to describe this type
of bid.
eBay versus "Live" Auctions
"Live" auctions share a number of characteristics
with eBay auctions, yet there are some important
differences including the type of bidding used.  eBay
auctions for single items exhibit characteristics of both the
English and sealed bid auctions.
Similar to English auctions, bids on eBay are
immediately published so that anyone interested in the
auction can know what the current highest executed bid
on an item is.  But unlike English auctions, eBay auctions
end at a specific time regardless of whether there is active
bidding.
In addition, the proxy bidding feature on eBay
takes on some aspects of a hybrid between first-price and
second-price sealed bid auctions.  Bidders cannot know
whether a bid will be the new high bid until after placing
it; they may have already been outbid through the proxy
bidding feature.  Nevertheless, unlike "live" sealed bid
auctions, bidders do receive immediate notification if
their bid has been topped.  Although high bidders on eBay
do not pay the amount of the second-highest bid, but pay
that plus the minimum bid increment, eBay auctions are
more similar to second-price than first-price sealed bid
auctions since the bidder pays only a modest increment
over the second-highest bid rather than the maximum he
or she is willing to bid for the item. Nevertheless, the
revenue realized in an auction won by a proxy bid should
be between the amounts expected for strict second-price
and first-price sealed bids.
Research Problem
Due to the combination of a set closing time for
auctions and the proxy bidding feature, eBay bidders have
devised some unique bidding strategies in an attempt to
successfully win bids.  In many active auctions, the bid
amounts and number of bids submitted greatly escalate in
the last few minutes of the auction.
The results will demonstrate the effects of the
constraints established in the eBay market structure, such
as the specific ending time and the availability of proxy
bidding. Auctions which are won by proxy bids submitted
in the earlier stages of the auction process most resemble
sealed bid auctions in that bidders have minimal
information regarding bids from competing bidders.
Another group of auctions are those won by proxy bids
submitted during the later stages of the auction process,
after a great deal of information has been revealed
regarding other bidders' interest in the item.  Finally, there
exists a set of auctions which most resemble English
auctions with straight bidding at minimum bid
increments.   The set of auctions being examined involve
very similar items.  We argue that the appropriate model
to follow is that of affiliated private values since bidders
have information regarding the values of the items by
examining other current and recent auctions.
Following the general model developed by
Milgrom and Weber (1982) we propose that auctions won
by proxy bids submitted during the later stages of an
auction will result in higher revenues than those submitted
during the early stages.  Similarly, auctions won by proxy
bids will result in final bids less than or equal to auctions
won by English-style bids.  The following hypotheses will
be tested:
H1:  Auctions which are won by proxy bids
submitted late in the auction will result in higher
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final bids than auctions which are won by proxy
bids submitted early in the auction.
H2a:  Auctions which are won by proxy bids
submitted early in the auction will result in final
bids less than or equal to those in auctions which
are won by English-style bids.
H2b:  Auctions which are won by proxy bids
submitted late in the auction will result in final
bids less than or equal to those in auctions which
are won by English-style bids.
Although the preceding hypotheses follow from
the theoretical model developed by Milgrom and Weber
(1982), the empirical work of Kagel, Harstad, and Levin
(1987) indicates that bidders behave irrationally at times.
In addition, none of the referenced studies examined the
effects of a set closing time for auctions.  The existence of
sub-optimal bidding strategies and the eBay market
structure may lead to results different than those
hypothesized.
Methods
The research in progress is examining single-
item auctions in the collectibles area.  This allows
analysis of many extremely similar auctions to look for
differences in bidding strategies and revenue realized.
The results of a large number of successful and
active auctions of identical collectibles will be analyzed.
Successful and active auctions are defined as those
auctions for which there are a minimum number of
different bidders and the reserve price, if any, is met.  The
timing of and price of winning bids and second-highest
bids will be examined to determine which auctions are
won by proxy bids and which by English-style bids.
Auctions which are won by proxy bids will be divided
into two different categories, those in which the winning
proxy bids were submitted during the earlier stages versus
the latter stages of the auction.
The hypotheses will be tested using t tests
comparing the amounts of the winning bids for auctions
won by proxy bids versus those won by English bids and
auctions won by early proxy bids versus those won by late
proxy bids.
Data collection is currently underway and
preliminary examination of the data indicates patterns in
bidding strategies.  Final results of the analysis will be
presented at the conference.
Contributions and Significance
To date, there has been little published research
on the effects of virtual auction web sites on bidding
strategies in single-item auctions.  Lucking-Reiley (1999)
examined auctions over the internet, but the structure of
those auctions resembles "live" by-mail auctions and the
results are not directly transferable.  Bapna et al. (2000)
analyzed the effects of multi-item auctions, yet bidding
strategies in these auctions are very different than those in
single-item auctions.  The results of this study should be
applicable to other auction sites with market structures
similar to eBay and have implications for bidders with
regard to successful bidding strategies, sellers who may
wish to choose an auction site that is likely to lead to the
highest bids, and managers of auction web sites who wish
to design auction support mechanisms to maximize
commission revenues.
Future research may include a further
investigation into the dominant auction ending policy that
should be adopted by auction site modelers by comparing
additional auction sites with different market structures.
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